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Over the past decade Internet connectivity has become an increasingly
essential feature on modern mobile devices. Many use-cases representing
the state of the art depend on connectivity. Smartphones, tablets, and
other devices alike can even be seen as access devices to Internet services
and applications. Getting a device connected requires either a data plan
from a mobile network operator (MNO), or alternatively connecting over
Wi-Fi wherever feasible. Data plans offered by MNO’s vary in terms of
price, quota size, and service quality based on regional causes. Expensive
data, poor cell coverage, or a limited quota has driven many users to look
for free Wi-Fis in hopes of finding a decent connection to satisfy the ever-
growing transmission need of modern Internet applications.
The standard for wireless local area networks (WLAN, IEEE 802.11) spec-
ifies a network discovery protocol for wireless devices to find surrounding
networks. The principle behind this discovery protocol dates back to the
early days of wireless networking. However, the scale at which Wi-Fi is
deployed and being utilized today is magnitudes larger than what it used
to be. In more recent years it was realized that the primitive network
discovery protocol combined with the large scale can be used for privacy
violations. Device manufacturers have acknowledged this issue and devel-
oped mechanisms, such as MAC address randomization, for preventing e.g.
user tracking based on Wi-Fi background traffic. These mechanisms have
been proven to be inefficient.
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The contributions of this thesis are two-fold. First, this thesis exposes
problems related to the 802.11 network discovery protocol. It presents a
highly efficient Wi-Fi traffic capturing system, through which we can show
distinct characteristics in the way how different mobile devices from various
brands and models scan for available networks. This thesis also looks at the
potentially privacy-compromising elements in these queries, and provides
a mechanism to quantify the information leak. Such collected information
combined with public crowdsourced data can pinpoint locations of interest,
such as home, workplace, or affiliation without user consent. Secondly, this
thesis proposes a novel mechanism, WiPush, to deliver messages over Wi-Fi
without association in order to avoid network discovery entirely. This mech-
anism leverages the existing, yet mostly inaccessible Wi-Fi infrastructure
to serve a wider scope of users. Lastly, this thesis provides a communi-
cation system for privacy-preserving, opportunistic, and lightweight Wi-Fi
communication without association. This system is built around an inex-
pensive companion device, which makes the concept adaptable for various
opportunistic short-range communication systems, such as smart traffic and
delay-tolerant networks.
Computing Reviews (2012) Categories and Subject
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Networks → Wireless access networks
Networks → Network privacy and anonymity
Security and privacy → Privacy protections
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Wi-Fi, Privacy, Tracking, Communication systems
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Internet connectivity has become an invaluable feature on mobile devices.
Many of the smart applications that have gained foothold in our everyday
life depend on Internet connectivity. As a well-known example, various
social media platforms have been adopted so profoundly that some even
experience distress because of a fear of missing out (FOMO) shortly after
ending up disconnected. Social connections, hobbies, and everyday tasks
in general are nowadays quite dependent on e.g. instant messaging plat-
forms and other online services. Even voice calls are slowly but steadily
being shifted to VoIP-calls that operate over a packet switching network.
Whether the use-case concerns social media, general Internet queries, news,
audio or video content, usually the content requires a data connection to a
cloud service hosted by data centers around the world.
There are generally two ways to get a personal smart device connected.
One way is to have a data plan included in a mobile subscription. These
data plans have differences in pricing, quota, and service quality depending
on regional factors and available mobile network operators (NMOs). Fin-
land being the top country in data consumed by mobile subscription1 is a
class example; nationwide coverage, modern infrastructure and MNO com-
petition has led to subscriptions with basically unlimited everything for a
flat rate. Unlike in many other countries, where a typical data plan in-
cludes a quota of few gigabytes at a fixed price, and for anything beyond
that an extra charge incurs. For example, the average price per 1 GB of
mobile data in the U.S. in 2019 was  12.372. Data roaming while traveling
abroad can also become quite expensive for someone not fully aware of the





data. This uncertainty in usage-based billing has led many to look for an
alternative way to get connected.
The other way to get connected is through Wi-Fi. Something that likely
started as a nice addition to conference venues and hotel services has since
become an important asset for anyone traveling. Complimentary Wi-Fi,
also commonly known as free Wi-Fi, is nowadays available at practically
any hotel and airport. A study conducted in 2017 [56] shows that for up
to 75% of survey respondents free Wi-Fi is a deciding factor when choosing
a hotel. For roughly 50% of the respondents free Wi-Fi affects the choice
of airlines and restaurants. The popularity and extent of how much free
Wi-Fis are sought after varies per country. As an example, since Finland
has been a forerunner in deploying and providing cellular data, there has
not emerged a solid demand for public Wi-Fis. Sparse population has also
alleviated congestion-related problems caused by the so-called mobile data
explosion during the last decade. Some commercial hotspot providing ser-
vices have been available3, but these are more enterprise-oriented solutions
and deployed primarily at congress centers and business hubs.
However, on a global scale technologies like Wi-Fi offloading [7, 48] are
a relevant topic. According to Cisco [2] up to 59% of all mobile data
will be offloaded to Wi-Fi by 2022. Exponential growth in mobile data
causes congestion problems for mobile network operators, and deploying
Wi-Fi hotspots for customers at strategically chosen locations can alleviate
these problems. Many operators complement their mobile subscriptions
by offering unlimited data over a network of Wi-Fi hotspots they provide.
User device association to such hotspot networks is often pre-programmed
by mobile subscription retailers. Typically, Wi-Fi access is provided in ex-
change for purchased goods or services, but it may also be public and require
no premises for joining. Such hotspots, typically located at malls, restau-
rants, and cafés, can also be seen as attractions to potential customers. As
an example, a major U.S.-based coffee shop franchise has teamed up with
Google, and have since been known to provide decent quality free Wi-Fi at
each location of their business. This has become common knowledge, and
almost anyone used to traveling knows which coffee shop to look for when
in need of Internet and coffee.
Even if a Wi-Fi is advertised to be free of charge, it may come at a price.
A study conducted by Norton in 2017 [56] revealed that 92% of Americans
admit having taken risks in form of accessing e.g. online banking services
over public Wi-Fi. Merely 27% use VPN when using public hotspots, while
up to 41% are not able to distinguish a secure Wi-Fi from an insecure one.
3e.g. Sonera Homerun, DNA WLAN
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There are various kinds of risks involved in using free Wi-Fis. To begin
with, associating to a free Wi-Fi implies trust between the user and the
network provider. Explicit claims of a Wi-Fi being secure can not always be
trusted since a fraudulent access point would make the same claims. As an
example, evil twin and rogue access points [15] are a common way execute
Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) style phishing attacks wherever there is free
Wi-Fi available [10,69]. Such attacks may be attempted by anyone because
Wi-Fi operates over an unlicensed band, and therefore eavesdropping and
transmitting fraudulent data frames is merely a matter of programming
and requires no special hardware. This is generally not considered to be a
problem as long as data channels are encrypted and secured accordingly.
However, various applications and even personal demographic information
can be identified by analyzing the characteristics of data flows [11, 12].
Disregarding such risks – or users simply not being aware of them – free
Wi-Fis are widely used and sought after.
The aforementioned offloading culture combined with the continuous
user-driven search for free networks at disposal has led to a situation where
Wi-Fi is always kept enabled. As a result, keeping Wi-Fi enabled causes
a device to intermittently query for networks to associate with. These
queries are eavesdroppable and may violate user privacy unknowingly and
without consent. This intentional device behavior enables various suspi-
cious activities, such as user tracking and profiling. These problems are
widely acknowledged and have since been addressed with mechanisms such
as MAC address randomization [31, 67]. Unfortunately practical software
implementations from device manufacturers have been shown to be ineffec-
tive one after another [50, 52,73].
Contributions of this thesis are two-fold. First, this thesis demonstrates
privacy problems caused by a combination of two habits; i) keeping Wi-Fi
enabled at all times, and ii) using random available free networks. We
start by presenting a multichannel Wi-Fi monitoring system, which reveals
a new identifying characteristic in the way devices query intermittently for
available and previously known networks. We then use this system to col-
lect data at various locations, and show that a privacy-violating network
discovery mechanism is still used by roughly one third of seen devices. We
show that exposing SSID names of previously associated networks can in-
validate the effects of any MAC address randomization mechanism. We
then introduce a metric to quantify the information leak caused by this
mechanism, and ultimately evaluate an alternative discovery mechanism,
which does not violate privacy or allow tracking. Secondly, this thesis pro-
poses novel ways of using Wi-Fi without association. The rationale behind
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this is to avoid two things; i) privacy-compromising network discoveries,
and ii) the need for associating to random free Wi-Fis. We first present an
opportunistic way to deliver push notifications over Wi-Fi without associ-
ation. This system leverages the high density of already deployed Wi-Fi
access points and proposes a network-centric mechanism to deliver contex-
tual notifications. We then present an infrastructure-less, association-free,
and opportunistic Wi-Fi communication system for various novel use cases,
such as smart traffic and delay-tolerant networks.
1.1 Background and Motivation
Wi-Fi is a commonly used trademark name for the Wireless Local Area
Networking (WLAN, IEEE 802.11, [1]) standard belonging to the IEEE 802
family of standards. Wi-Fi was designed to work seamlessly together with
Ethernet and effectively replace the last hop with a wireless link. This
would then provide mobility to devices like laptop computers. Both Wi-
Fi and Ethernet implement the bottom two layers of the OSI networking
stack. Due to a different medium, their approach on the physical layer
differs, while on the data link layer they share many similarities for the sake
of seamless interoperability. However, extending e.g. a company intranet
over Wi-Fi requires much stronger access control, since potential intruders
do not need physical access to network wires. Hence, authentication has
been a core feature in Wi-Fi from the beginning.
In order for a client device to interact with a Wi-Fi network it has to
discover the network first. The standard specifies a network discovery pro-
tocol which involves sending out probe requests from the client-side, and
the access point (AP) replying with a probe response. This is often re-
ferred to as active network discovery, although not specified as such by the
standard. Active network discovery was strictly necessary for discovering
so-called hidden networks. For a long time there was a myth about hidden
APs being more secure and less prone to intrusion attacks than the ones
periodically advertising their presence. These myths have been busted in
literature and it is been generally acknowledged that hidden networks pro-
vided merely a false impression of security [64]. Despite hidden networks
are deprecated, the network discovery protocol still used today reminds us
of their existence. There is a dedicated field in probe requests for a list of
network names, i.e. service set identifiers (SSIDs), the client is looking for.
Probe requests looking for specific networks are known as directed probes.
As of today, most APs transmit beacons at regular intervals to adver-
tise the SSID for the network they offer, and thus directed probes are not
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needed. However, for unjustified reasons directed probes are still used in
vain, but more importantly, they introduce a potential privacy violation.
The extent at which Wi-Fi is deployed and used today has led to a situation
where anyone with a laptop can start collecting lists of network SSIDs that
surrounding Wi-Fi enabled devices have been associated to in the past.
Connecting the dots in these lists with the help of external crowdsourced
access point mapping (a.k.a. wardriving) services can reveal a surprising
amount of personally identifiable information (PII) without the target user
knowing anything about the information leak.
The scale and widespread use of Wi-Fi was probably not expected back
when active network discovery was on the drawing board. The Wi-Fi stan-
dard has since been revised and amended regularly, but plaintext SSID
names in background traffic still persist. The Wi-Fi standard does support
an alternative network discovery method referred to as passive discovery.
However, many device manufacturers and especially their operating system
departments still put out products which employ active network discovery.
The mentality appears to be such that since active network discovery still
works, it does not need fixing.
Various novel networking paradigms, such as opportunistic and delay-
tolerant networking (DTN) [27], require nimble communication mechanisms
to operate. Since communication encounters may be short and sparse,
overhead in establishing the communication channel should be minimized.
The conventional way of communicating over Wi-Fi implies first discovery
of an appropriate service set, followed by authentication and association.
This whole procedure can take several seconds, which could be long enough
to defeat the purpose of establishing a connection in the first place. Several
Wi-Fi variations [26,71,79] have been proposed, but they often do not gain
foothold due to complex deployment and low-level modifications to devices.
There is even an IEEE standard for Wi-Fi mesh networks [37], but devices
supporting it off-the-shelf are uncommon.
The motivation for this thesis goes back to creating mobility models
for opportunistic and delay-tolerant networks. The user traces for these
models were to be based on background Wi-Fi traffic collected from ran-
dom users at public locations. The first field experiment was conducted
in downtown Helsinki in late summer of 2014. A summary of this ex-
periment is presented in Appendix A of this thesis. The outcome of this
experiment was interesting per se, but more interesting was the alarm-
ing amount of seemingly private network names embedded in the collected
data. After realizing the fact that devices using MAC address random-
ization would appear as several different devices, we started working on
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tracing random MAC addresses back to their original entities. In order to
get a holistic view of surrounding background traffic we designed the Wire-
less Shark, which we present in Paper I. While using this system to collect
more data we found out that seemingly random devices were broadcasting
identical long lists of previously associated private network names. This
discovery led us to further investigate the information leak in Wi-Fi net-
work discovery, which we present in Paper II. The second half of this thesis
was motivated by association-free and ubiquitous Wi-Fi communication for
various novel use-cases. In Paper III we propose an opportunistic notifi-
cation delivery mechanism called WiPush. The proposed system provides
a network-centric top-down message delivery mechanism which leverages
the density of deployed Wi-Fi access points for contextual awareness. In
Paper IV we propose a system for bidirectional and association-free Wi-Fi
communication between mobile peers.
1.2 Problem Statement
Research questions we explore in this thesis can be divided into two areas
which reflect the title of this thesis; Privacy-Aware Opportunistic Wi-Fi.
In this section we present our research questions and the rationale behind
them. The first set of questions is privacy-oriented:
RQ1: What kind of device and/or user related information is deducible
from eavesdropped Wi-Fi background traffic?
RQ2: How effective are MAC address randomization techniques intro-
duced by various manufacturers in preserving user privacy?
RQ3: How can we prevent private information from leaking through the
network discovery protocol defined by the Wi-Fi standard?
The problem behind RQ1 was discovered while collecting data for mo-
bility traces. Since Wi-Fi traffic can be listened by practically anyone,
suspicious activities such as user fingerprinting can be performed with-
out user consent. We want to find out how much personal or otherwise
user identifying information is exposed through background traffic. De-
vice manufacturers and software providers have acknowledged the issue
regarding personal information leaking and tracking being done based on
background. The general solution has been MAC address randomization.
With RQ2 we want to find out are these mechanisms effective – but more
importantly – have they fixed the problem? Both RQ1 and RQ2 focus on a
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problem caused primarily by active network discovery, which is performed
intermittently by Wi-Fi capable devices in a stand-by state. With RQ3 we
want to raise the idea of avoiding active network discovery in its entirety.
The second set of research questions relate to opportunistic networking:
RQ4: Can we leverage the transmission range of Wi-Fi clients and use
it as a location-centric addressing mechanism?
RQ5: Can we utilize the existing Wi-Fi infrastructure of restricted ac-
cess points and make it useful for a broader scope of clients?
RQ6: How could experimental Wi-Fi communication systems be piloted
with minimal deployment effort and overhead?
Wi-Fi has a typical transmission range from a few ten meters up to
a hundred meters, or even more depending on the circumstances. While
transmission range is often considered to be a restricting factor, we ask
with RQ4 whether range could be used as a location-defining property for
e.g. context-aware notifications. The density of deployed access points
is so high that urban areas are fully covered with Wi-Fi. However, in
practice it is merely a small fraction of them that are accessible or otherwise
useful to an average user. With RQ5 we ask whether we can leverage
the high density of access points to serve a larger audience. Many novel
communication protocols and networking systems require low-level changes
to user devices. On modern heterogeneous smart devices such changes
can be complicated, warranty-voiding, or even impossible to implement.
However, novel networking systems, such as the ones sought after in RQ4
and RQ5, require opt-in users for testing and piloting. In RQ6 we ask what
would be an effortless and attractive way to engage opt-in users in such
experimental systems.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
Contributions of this thesis are two-fold. The first half, i.e. Papers I and
II, have a focus on background traffic that is leaking from user devices
and how much of a privacy issue it is. The second half, Papers III and
IV, focuses on alternative, association-free and opportunistic ways of using
Wi-Fi for various novel use cases. Table 1.1 shows a mapping between
Papers I through IV reprinted in this thesis and the Research Questions
presented in Section 1.2.
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Research Question
Research Paper 1 2 3 4 5 6
1.
The Wireless Shark: Identifying WiFi
Devices Based on Probe Fingerprints
X X
2.
Quantifying the Information Leak in
IEEE 802.11 Network Discovery
X X X
3.







Table 1.1: A table indicating how Papers I through IV [3, 75–77] address
the Research Questions 1 through 6 presented in Section 1.2.
In Paper I [75] we present a multichannel Wi-Fi capturing system we
call the Wireless Shark. We demonstrate its effectiveness and use it to
collect background data from several devices in a controlled environment.
We expose network discovery, i.e. probing behavior of these devices and
classify different kinds of behavior. We also expose what a single network
discovery attempt looks like when listening to all channels simultaneously.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the only published research that ex-
poses channel sweeping characteristics and differences of network discovery
implementations on smart devices.
In Paper II [76] we further inspect data that can be collected with a Wi-
Fi monitoring system. We classify different types of SSID names and pro-
vide a mechanism to quantify the occurring information leak. We introduce
a metric, uniqueness, which indicates how unique an entity is in a crowd.
We apply all known MAC address de-randomization techniques [51,52,73]
to our six data sets, and show that MAC address randomization does not
have a dramatic impact on the uniqueness distribution in a crowd. We also
evaluate an alternative network discovery mechanism, passive discovery,
which does not leak private information.
Paper III proposes a mobile push notification system called WiPush [3].
It is an opportunistic and context-aware message delivery system that op-
erates over conventional Wi-Fi without association. The system leverages
existing Wi-Fi infrastructure and has the capability of targeting user groups
with a granularity level defined by the transmission range of an access
point. In addition to close range notification, WiPush has the capability
to forward cloud- and cell-based notification to end-users as well. We im-
plemented WiPush on an Android smartphone and an OpenWRT-based
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access point. We evaluate it in terms of energy consumption, delivery rate,
latency, and impact on other network traffic.
An important lesson learned from WiPush is that implementing low-
level changes on off-the-shelf hardware can be a complicated and tedious
process – lucky if even possible with devices at disposal. In Paper IV
we propose the Prongle system [77]. It is a lightweight communication
system for various use-cases requiring opportunistic communication, such
as smart traffic, delay-tolerant networks, and push notification systems,
such as WiPush. Prongle devices communicate over conventional Wi-Fi
hardware in an unassociated manner. The system is implemented on a
separate device, and hence requires no modifications on smartphones. A
Prongle device is paired over Bluetooth to an Android smartphone, from
where interaction happens through an app. A Prongle device acts as a
proxy between opportunistic communication and a user device. This results
in an interface protecting user privacy while still being able to engage in
opportunistic and novel networks.
Contributions of this thesis are covered by this manuscript as follows.
Chapter 2 presents privacy-related problems originating from the current
Wi-Fi network discovery protocol. These problems were originally pre-
sented and discussed in Papers I and II. Chapter 3 covers two proposals
of opportunistic communication systems that are not affected by privacy
problems presented in Chapter 2. These two systems were originally pre-




For an average user privacy may not be of as great importance as other
more visible and pragmatic features on a smartphone. An all-too-common
mentality is that a privacy violation can not occur if a person has nothing
to hide. This thinking boils down to the false premise of privacy being all
about hiding something that is wrong or illegal [68], hence privacy is often
overlooked. However, if and when a violation is revealed and demonstrated
to affected subjects, privacy instantly becomes a highly appreciated quality.
After the violation incident has occurred there may not be any courses
of action to correct whatever harm was done. The scale and potential
impact of privacy violations often exceeds common assumptions, which was
witnessed in 2018 with Facebook and Cambridge Analytica [42].
We argue that demonstrating privacy-related problems to an audience
is an effective wake-up-call for users to self-reflect their habits and ways of
operation. In this chapter we discuss issues related to Wi-Fi background
traffic and present a multichannel capturing system for more efficient traffic
monitoring. We also discuss privacy problems caused by the widely used
active network discovery protocol and provide a way to quantify how much
it leaks personally identifiable information (PII).
2.1 Background Traffic
Since wireless transmission is a broadcast medium and Wi-Fi operates on
the unlicensed ISM-band1, all traffic is observable by any receiver within
transmission range. Even if an access point (AP) uses encryption to protect
data packets sent over the air, third parties are able to eavesdrop an on-
going Wi-Fi packet exchange. The IEEE 802.11 [1] standard defines three
1Industrial, Scientific and Medical radio band defined by the ITU Radio Regulations
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categories of frames: data, control, and management frames. Data frames
tend to be encrypted, but control and management frames are exchanged
prior to any encryption keys, which means the intent behind these frames
is visible to anyone. The primary reason for anyone to observe background
traffic is to gather information about the surrounding network. This infor-
mation can be used for both good and evil purposes. As an example, passive
device fingerprinting [43] is often used by malicious parties in order to find
specific networked devices or protocols with known vulnerabilities that can
be compromised or hijacked. Other malicious activities requiring network
monitoring are various denial of service attacks [14]. Channel switch and
quiet attacks [45] as well as deauthentication and disassociation [20] at-
tacks require state information, i.e. a counterfeit identity, correct timing
and valid sequence numbers, in order to succeed.
Traffic monitoring can also be used for good intentions, such as detect-
ing and reacting to aforementioned threats [5, 6, 8, 15,32,33,41,69], as well
as debugging interference and other misbehavior in wireless networks [58].
Various novel proposals even use background traffic (commonly referred to
as noise) as input signals in their system [4,38,66,72,80]. Regardless of the
intentions wireless monitoring is used for, a more effective monitoring sys-
tem provides a more comprehensive understanding of surrounding network
activity. In this section we present a multichannel monitoring system, the
Wireless Shark, originally presented in Paper I [75].
2.1.1 Methodology
Wi-Fi operates commonly on the 2.4 and 5.0 GHz radio bands. These bands
are further divided into channels, which can be used to alleviate congestion
caused by simultaneous transmissions. For a monitoring entity activity
of interest may be ongoing on any of the channels. However, conventional
Wi-Fi chips on consumer and professional-grade devices are technically lim-
ited to operate – either transmit or receive – on only one channel at a time.
Some amendments2 of the 802.11 standard support MIMO (multiple input,
multiple output), which allows simultaneous transmission links over multi-
ple antennas, i.e. channels, in order to achieve spatial multiplexing. Even
if devices supporting MIMO are capable of receiving up to 4 simultaneous
streams, that is only a fraction of the total amount of available channels.
Multichannel monitoring is often implemented through channel hopping,
which allocates one input stream to different channels turn by turn. This
reduces dwell time per channel linearly depending on how many channels
2802.11n, 802.11ac, 802.11ax
































Figure 2.1: Capturability. Figure was originally presented in Paper I.
are being monitored in total. The effectiveness of capturing, i.e. captura-
bility, can be optimized through e.g. allocating more time to channels that
are more active, or reducing the amount of channels to be monitored.
Despite the amount of activity regarding wireless traffic monitoring
there are few papers or literature about capturing systems themselves.
Work by Meng et al. [53] explains very thoroughly how a wireless cap-
turing tool is built. However, their work also implies channel hopping for
multichannel monitoring. Various distributed monitoring systems have also
been proposed [9, 55]. Our motivation for multichannel monitoring with a
non-distributed single host system is to achieve microsecond time resolu-
tion between captured frames on different channels. This would then allow
us to get insight on how devices perform channel sweeps when scanning for
networks. We argue that true multichannel monitoring is achievable only
through dedicating Wi-Fi adapters for individual channels. In Paper I we
build such a system and compare it to various adapters-per-channel con-
figurations utilizing channel hopping. Figure 2.1 shows the linear decrease
of traffic captured as the amount of network adapters. Our monitoring
approach has a premise to be as fundamental as possible in capturing all
surrounding traffic.
2.1.2 Data Collection Considerations
User consent is a topic that must not be omitted when collecting seemingly
private data. The problem with collecting data from a network is that con-
sent can be tricky to ask since the person responsible for the data remains
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unknown. There may be no other trace of the person other than the MAC
address of the device. Device-specific MAC addresses on the other hand
are not bound in any way to the person carrying the device, and since
MAC address randomization became more common the idea of coupling
a MAC address back to a person is even more challenging. Nevertheless,
MAC addresses have been classified as PII. The European Data Protection
Supervisor (EDPS) working party 29 (WP29) outlined in their statement
13/2011 that a MAC address combined with location information is per-
sonal data. Since we know the locations and the times our data sets were
collected, we can safely say that our data shall be treated accordingly.
A MAC address is a 48-bit long identifier, which is usually represented
as six octets. The first half of the identifier is the so-called organizationally
unique identifier (OUI) governed by IEEE3. This part identifies a device
and/or chipset manufacturer, and it is often the same throughout a range
of devices of the same brand. The second half of a MAC address can be
assigned by manufacturers as they wish, but ideally with respect to each
address being unique. The data sets we have collected for publications
reprinted in this thesis have been anonymized. In order to retain manufac-
turer information and whether it is a universally (UAA) or locally (LAA)
administered address4, we merely one-way hashed the latter half of each
MAC address.
2.2 Privacy Problems
For the sake of clarity in terminology, let us define the meaning of three key
concepts in the scope of this thesis; privacy, anonymity, and uniqueness:
Privacy is the capability of keeping information private. In Wi-Fi track-
ing context, such information typically concerns home location, work-
place, affiliation, travel destinations, and so on.
Anonymity is the ability to perform tasks without revealing identity. The
task may be observed by others, but it shall not reveal sensitive in-
formation. Such tasks can be e.g. a network discovery query.
Uniqueness is the concept we use to describe how much an entity stands
out in a crowd. The more unique a user is, the less likely there is
another one that appears and acts the same.
3IEEE Registration Authority
4UAA or LAA is indicated by the second least significant bit of the first octet.
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With these terms defined, we can claim that privacy starts to deteriorate
when data points from the same anonymous entity are aggregated. The
situation could get even worse through exposing information about the
user, which we will demonstrate a practical scenario about in Section 4.2. In
this section we present two privacy problems, i.e. fingerprinting and PNL,
related to Wi-Fi background traffic, and finally introduce user uniqueness
as a metric to quantify how unique a device is in a crowd.
A prominent source of Wi-Fi background traffic is the active network
discovery protocol specified by the Wi-Fi standard. Tracking is one way in
which background traffic has been exploited for e.g. targeted advertising
on public displays on recycling bins in London back in 2013. Harnessing
a network of Wi-Fi scanners inside trashcans and collecting information
regarding where a particular user is and profiling that user for advertise-
ments was a privacy violation big enough to make the news. However, since
passive monitoring can not be detected, it is hard to say whether similar
systems are still active.
However, tracking users is not inherently malicious behavior. Various
kinds of novel systems benefit from e.g. mobility models generated from
user traces. Appendix A in this thesis explains early work [74] by the
author which covers the basic concept of generating user traces based on
real people movement. There are several proposed systems in this area that
differ in both scale and e.g. other technologies they augment [60,62,65].
2.2.1 Fingerprinting
Device fingerprinting [57] has shown that privacy-preserving techniques in-
volving pseudonyms and MAC address randomization are ineffective. Wire-
less driver implementations and low-level networking components of oper-
ating systems have distinct characteristics and patterns in how traffic and
frames are generated. Active fingerprinting involves querying devices in
a specific way and monitoring the response to those queries [17]. On the
contrary, passive fingerprinting requires no interaction with a target de-
vice, which makes the process completely unobtrusive. Typically, passive
techniques exploit recognizable patterns in frame headers including flags
and fields used in them [54], such as information elements encapsulated in
probe requests [73], or the content of preferred networks list (PNL), which
we discuss closer in Section 2.2.2. Statistical methods have also proven to
be effective, which perform device profiling based on e.g. duration values
wireless devices tend to choose [18] or the timing between consecutive dis-
patched frames [52]. For comprehensive device fingerprinting it is desirable
to use as many individualizing parameters as possible.
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In this thesis we present yet another fingerprinting parameter. Since
Wi-Fi networks may operate on different channels in order to avoid prob-
lems caused by RF congestion, devices look for networks on several chan-
nels. With the multichannel monitoring Wireless Shark monitoring system
we presented in Section 2.1.1 we are able to inspect the interchannel be-
havior of wireless devices. Our measurements show that different devices
and operating systems discover networks differently. A network discovery
attempt consists of several probe request frames transmitted in a so-called
burst. The amount of probe frames and the duration of one burst varies.
The channel sweeping pattern and the time spent on each channel varies
as well. Figure 2.2 illustrates two different network discovery attempts.
Additional burst characteristics are presented in Paper I [75].
2.2.2 Preferred Networks List
When a device is initially associated to a Wi-Fi network, various informa-
tion elements are stored for future associations. This so-called Preferred
Networks List (PNL) stores wireless network identifiers, i.e. SSIDs, as well
as authentication-related security details. The user may choose to delib-
erately forget a particular network, but on many devices’ inclusion of a
network to the PNL is the default behavior. An SSID is a cleartext han-
dle through which networks are recognized by users and devices. In order
for devices to conveniently join familiar networks the SSID and relevant
authentication information must be stored on the device. Hence, the pur-
pose of a construct like PNL is justified. However, broadcasting SSID
names outside the device is not necessary5, nor justified. Despite being
unnecessary, exposing the names of previously associated networks could
potentially compromise privacy.
Collecting leaked PNLs from surrounding background traffic is trivial.
PNL entries, i.e. user-requested SSID names, are encapsulated as cleartext
in probe requests. These frames are of management type [1], which are by
design exchanged prior to any key exchange, and therefore not encrypted in
any way. A generic undirected probe request is a broadcast question asking
whether there are any networks around. On the other hand, a directed
probe asks around for one or several specific networks. In a common case
the latter is not required, since access points (AP) advertise themselves
through beacon frames periodically. Despite active network discovery is
not necessary, it is still widely employed. Conducted research from recent
years indicates that active probing is still used [13,25,28,38,76]. The data
5Hidden networks require active probing, but they are strongly deprecated [64].
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Samsung Galaxy S5 (Android 5.0)
Figure 2.2: Illustration of two different network discovery attempts. On
the Nexus 5 one channel sweeping burst of probe requests takes roughly
400 ms, while on the Galaxy S5 it takes over 1000 ms. The amount of
frames per burst also varies.
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Table 2.1: Data set described in numbers. Table was originally presented














Eurosys 2017 101.1 k 41.8% 3558 2077 55.1% 608 (29.3%)
Pop concert 129.4 k 33.0% 5225 2280 28.8% 543 (23.8%)
Workers day 96.9 k 34.4% 10363 5541 25.3% 1376 (24.8%)
Movie 108.6 k 28.7% 5869 2540 29.9% 678 (26.7%)
Mall 98.4 k 33.0% 7787 5567 30.8% 1030 (18.5%)
Campus 205.5 k 43.0% 6824 2606 39.1% 652 (25.0%)
sets we collected show that on average roughly 35% of wireless entities were
leaking out PNL information. Further details regarding the data sets can
be found in Table 2.1 and Paper II [76].
2.2.3 User Uniqueness
Attempts of improving user privacy in Wi-Fi has been seen in the past.
Disposable MAC addresses [31,67], through which wireless devices can act
as “random” entities, has been proposed to eliminate traceability. It has,
however, been shown that using this so-called MAC address randomiza-
tion is not sufficient to eliminate tracking [51, 52]. Several studies have
shown that hiding behind pseudonyms is not enough because there are
many other parameters that can be used for identifying, i.e. fingerprinting,
Wi-Fi clients [24, 25, 57]. The key idea behind using random pseudonyms
is to have an alternative identity that seemingly blends into a crowd. A
pseudonym should also be disposable, since if one gets compromised it is
easy to introduce a new one. Conceptually this can be categorized as MAC
address spoofing, which to many networking oriented people has a malicious
connotation.
Even if an entity manages to conceal the true identity behind dispos-
able identifiers, actions and behavior can reveal the identity behind several
identifiers. One way to connect fake identifiers is through device finger-
printing [57]. Another way for anonymity chasing entities to reveal their
identity is through exposing parts of their preferred networks list (PNL).
Unarguably the best way to stay unnoticed and untraceable through Wi-Fi
is to not transmit anything. However, since users tend to leave Wi-Fi en-
abled and devices have an urge to get connected, there often is background
traffic that allows e.g. tracking. The second best way to stay anonymous is
to not transmit anything that can be connected to earlier appearances, or
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of SSID significance values. Popular SSIDs have
high significance values. The heavy tail indicates that most witnessed SSIDs
are unique. Figure was originally presented in Paper II [76].
that is otherwise identifiable. According to our collected data (Table 2.1)
on average 35% of devices transmit PNL information, which compromises
anonymity. In Paper II [76] we present a metric to quantify how unique a
single user is in a crowd. We use uniqueness to describe how well a wireless
entity stands out, i.e. how unique it is, in a crowd based on the background
traffic we can passively collect. In order to calculate uniqueness we first
need background data with PNL information. We then define uniqueness
as follows.
Let entity e have a PNL with k distinct SSID names (2.1) and rank of
n be the number of entities that have network n in their PNL (2.2):
PNLe = {n1, n2, ..., nk} (2.1)
rankni = |ni| (2.2)







The significance of a single SSID depends on how common that SSID
in the context it appears in. As a practical example, an SSID related to a
mobile network operator is common in the area where that MNO operates,
but can be unique in another country. Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of
significance values in the data sets we collected. A low significance value
contributes more to the uniqueness of an entity. The heavy tail of the
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distribution indicates that most SSIDs make users broadcasting them more
unique. Further details and SSID classification can be found in Paper II.
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Uniqueness values are normalized values between 0 and 1. A high
uniqueness value indicates how well a user stands out from a crowd by
looking at the PNL content that is exposed. Anonymous users have a
uniqueness value of 0 by definition.
2.3 Active vs. Passive Network Discovery
What could we do to correct the privacy threats introduced in this section?
One effective way to reduce the amount of background traffic is to use
passive instead of active network discovery. In Paper II [76] we compared
active versus passive network discovery, and based on the evaluation we can
conclude that in most cases the extra time it takes for passive discovery
to find a network is negligible. With typical beaconing intervals around
100 ms from the AP the discovery time is 0.6 seconds longer. Figure 2.4
shows a comparison of the two. Another motivation to reduce background
traffic is for the common good. It has been shown that aggressive network
discovery deteriorates throughput and increases energy consumption [39].
Techniques to detect the causes of unnecessary network scanning have been
proposed [29], which could help firmware developers create more sophisti-
cated network discovery strategies. Some manufacturers have introduced



































































Figure 2.4: Active vs. passive scanning.
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2.4 Summary
In this section we pointed out problems caused by background Wi-Fi traffic
primary belonging to active network discoveries. We implemented a mul-
tichannel Wi-Fi monitoring system, and demonstrated yet another way to
fingerprint devices based on distinct channel sweeping patterns employed by
different devices during network discovery. We used the monitoring system
to collect data sets which contain potentially sensitive information regard-
ing networks a user device has associated to in the past. We introduced a
metric to quantify how unique a user is in a crowd if a list of previously
associated network names is exposed. We also compared active and passive
network discovery protocols, and argued that in the vast majority of cases




All the privacy threatening phenomenons presented in this thesis are related
to network discovery, and the habit of carelessly associating to any free Wi-
Fi. These are widely recognized problems, but the strong need for Internet
connectivity often drives users to take risks [56]. Protocols like Hotspot 2.0
have been proposed [78] to alleviate these risks and the inconvenience of
typing in login credentials and passphrases while joining a Wi-Fi. In 2012
Cisco listed [21] “login process” and “hotspot selection” as user frustrating
usability problems with public hotspots back then. Eight years later we can
safely say that these usability problems are still around to frustrate users.
Because of the constantly increasing amount of mobile users and rapid
growth of data being consumed by them [2], the so-called mobile data ex-
plosion puts a lot of pressure on networking technologies. While mobile
network operators (MNO) struggle to meet the ever-increasing demand
of data, offloading technologies using alternative transmission links have
gained interest [7, 48,63]. According to Cisco [2] up to 59% of mobile data
will be offloaded over Wi-Fi by 2022. How MNOs and networking equip-
ment and device manufacturers will achieve this remains to be seen. The
idea of a metropolitan-scale free and open Wi-Fi is what many cities would
surely like to offer, but eventual gains would not cover deployment and
maintenance costs. Especially since Internet connectivity can be monetized
by MNOs. The economic viability of providing public Wi-Fi connectivity
was questioned already back in 2002 [36]. The aforementioned Hotspot 2.0
has been proposed as an enabling technique for handling associations to
offloading networks automatically [81]. As of today, Hotspot 2.0 is a sub-
scription service that operates through roaming, which has an impact on
e.g. handover performance due to the overhead introduced by ANQP and
credential checking [47].
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Opportunistic networks have been proposed as alternative transmission
links [35,40,59] for mobile data offloading. Many proposals exploit human
mobility and social behavior in order to improve communication in various
ways [16, 34, 61]. One big obstacle for opportunistic networks is how to
establish communication links between endpoints. Several proposals rely
solely on Wi-Fi in different configurations, including Wi-Fi Direct [22, 30],
ad hoc [49], and infrastructure [26, 70].
Another novel idea for accessing offloading capabilities is through Wi-Fi
without association. In such a scenario any available Wi-Fi could satisfy the
need for communication with no authentication and association required.
As a remark, it is crucial to note that “association-free Wi-Fi” is not the
same as “free Wi-Fi”, which has been mentioned earlier in this thesis. This
so-called ubiquitous Wi-Fi was visualized as early as in 2002 [36] when
wireless networking started to become a widespread commodity. It has since
persisted as a research vision, but in practice repeatedly outmaneuvered
by developments in cellular data [44]. The high density of access points
at metropolitan areas has coverage for a city-wide offloading Wi-Fi, but
the vast majority of networks require authentication, which renders them
useless for an average user. Other open questions regarding ubiquitous
Wi-Fi are e.g. who provides the service, and whether networks can be
trusted. Security-wise it is a positive and current trend that security is
migrating more and more to the application layer.
Implementations for association-free Wi-Fi exist [79], but deploying
such typically require low-level changes to software on devices, which in
turn effectively discourages potential user bases to form. In this section we
present two systems representing opportunistic and association-free com-
munication over Wi-Fi.
3.1 Push Notifications over Wi-Fi
Push notifications are small messages delivered from cloud services to user
devices intended to notify the user of e.g. an incoming message or another
event. Major mobile operating systems run their own notification services;
Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) and Apple Push Notification (APN). Such
services enable third-party app developers to push notification messages to
app users. The notification service – knowing how to reach the user – will
then take care of delivering the notification through some available data
transport channel.
In Paper III we propose a system called WiPush. The system is an
opportunistic notification delivery system which leverages the dense de-
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Figure 3.1: WiPush delivery mechanism.
ployment of Wi-Fi access points (AP). WiPush is a best-effort messaging
layer which operates over Wi-Fi without association. The transmission
range of APs provide an intrinsic spatio-temporal addressing mechanism
for the system. Contextual notifications, such as information regarding
surrounding services, can thus be disseminated from specific APs instead
of first resolving and then addressing all relevant clients within an area.
Hereby any services initiating a notification delivery do not need to know
the locations of target users.
Since WiPush is opportunistic and association-free, we exploit incoming
network discovery protocol queries from the client-side to deliver messages
when a device is listening. When a device dispatches probe requests in
order to discover networks, it has to wait for a brief moment after each
query for incoming probe responses. After listening for a specified time the
device then switches channel and transmits probe requests on that channel.
This channel sweeping behavior during network discovery is illustrated in
Figure 2.2. WiPush leverages this so-called channel time window, and
delivers the notification to a device during it. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
delivery mechanism.
WiPush was designed with three design challenges; DC1: Compliance
with the existing Wi-Fi specification. Since WiPush uses public action
frames to deliver notifications, it does not conflict or violate the Wi-Fi
standard in any way. Contextual notification protocols similar to WiPush
have been proposed, but often proximity in them is complemented by some
other technology, such as Bluetooth [46,71]. Entirely Wi-Fi based solutions
exist, but e.g. Beacon stuffing [19] can be considered to abuse the standard.
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DC2: Directed notification messages. An essential property for push
notifications is the ability to target them to specific users. WiPush uses
MAC addresses exposed by probe requests to address individual devices.
Probe responses and notification encapsulating action frames are sent to
the same recipient successively. How an AP is able to validate a user and
prevent hijacking of push notifications through MAC address spoofing was
left for future work.
DC3: Minimal energy expenditure. Battery life is an important and
highly valued asset on modern smart devices. Hence, we wanted to mini-
mize energy expenditure. WiPush exploits the channel time listening win-
dow initiated by network discovery. This way WiPush does not cause extra
channel switching, frame transmissions, or other hardware activity on the
client-side in order to operate.
WiPush can ideally be implemented on existing commodity hardware,
which reduces deployment costs. Our pilot deployment of the system was
implemented on an OpenWRT based access point and a Google Nexus 5
android-based smartphone. A system description, implementation details,
and system evaluation regarding performance and energy expenditure can
be found in Paper III [3].
3.2 Novel Applications
Many novel communication protocols require low-level changes to wireless
drivers or operating system components [79]. With ordinary consumer
devices such modifications can be complicated to carry out. Many manu-
facturers make it deliberately hard or practically impossible to implement
modifications. This does not help with piloting experimental systems and
attracting new users. In Paper IV we propose a system for lightweight
communication over unassociated Wi-Fi. We labeled it the Prongle sys-
tem. The system uses so-called prongle devices to create a communication
layer. Prongle devices are personal companion devices that act as gate-
ways to various kinds of novel and opportunistic networks. A separate
communication device provides more flexibility and control in using Wi-Fi
to communicate. The Prongle system also provides a privacy-protecting
interface between personal devices and public activity. This interface is
illustrated in Figure 3.2. Since all communication goes through a prongle
device, only the prongle is visible to the public, allowing end-user devices to
remain in the background. Communication gateways are known as proxies,
and the device itself has the form of a dongle. Hence the name Prongle.
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Figure 3.2: Prongle system creates an interface between user privacy and
public activity.
The Prongle system communicates on top of a layer of prongle de-
vices, which in turn communicate with each other in an unassociated and
opportunistic way over conventional Wi-Fi hardware. End-users interact
with the system through smart devices, such as smartphones. Each smart-
phone is paired to a prongle device over Bluetooth, and all communication
to the Prongle systems goes via the prongle device. An illustration of
the communication path can be seen in Figure 3.3. From the smartphone
point-of-view, accessing opportunistic networks through a Bluetooth acces-
sory device leaves other Internet connection links, i.e. cellular and Wi-Fi,
untouched on the device. Since opportunistic networks may be able to pro-
vide only delay-tolerant communication, it is justified to reserve cellular
data and integrated Wi-Fi capabilities on smartphones for real-time con-
nections. This separation of opportunistic communication to an external
device also implies that no modifications are required on user devices, which
makes piloting novel systems easier as users can use any device they prefer.
One of the key design principles was to have a system which is effortless
for new users to opt-in.
We propose four use-cases for our Prongle system; Smart traffic. In
the current state-of-art pedestrian and cyclist detection relies solely on sen-
sors on vehicles and object detection through on-board cameras. Vehicles
with smart electronics can utilize digital communication and protocols like
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) to announce their presence in a traffic scenario.
We propose that our Prongle system could be used for communication be-
tween light-traffic users and vehicles. A prongle device would announce its
presence by periodically transmitting beacons, which could then be noted
by other surrounding smart traffic users. We like to think of this as a
wireless reflector — without the need for line-of-sight to be spotted.
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of the communication path between an Android-
based user device and opportunistic Wi-Fi through a Prongle device.
Push notifications. Similarly to WiPush we presented in Paper III
and Section 3.1, the Prongle system can be used for contextual opportunis-
tic push messages. An important lesson learned while developing WiPush
was that system piloting and deployment should be made as effortless as
possible. With the Prongle system opportunistic and unassociated Wi-Fi
communication requires no modifications, rooting or implementing changes
on a heterogeneous set of opt-in users devices.
Audience response systems. Various public events are augmented
by including responses from the audience. One way to achieve this is to
provide a hotspot through which the audience can access inputs of the
response system. Participation in such situations tends to be somewhat
reluctant. With Prongle system communication users would not have to
associate with the hotspot provided, and anonymity could be preserved.
Delay-tolerant networks. Ad hoc communication has a key role
in enabling opportunistic and delay-tolerant networks (DTN). Establish-
ing communication links and routing in a mobile ad hoc network [23] is a
widely researched topic. Our Prongle system provides a flexible platform
to implement opportunistic and DTN strategies on top of.
A prongle device consists of a Raspberry Pi single-board computer and
a battery pack to power it. An Android app is used to interact with the
prongle device. Implementation for both the prongle device1 and the app2
are publicly available. Details regarding the implementation and perfor-





One way to alleviate the issues caused by background traffic is to reduce
the need to resort to incidental free Wi-Fis. With the so-called mobile
data explosion around the corner, this can be a tricky task. Opportunistic
networks have emerged as a complementing communication paradigm for
data offloading. Such networks typically operate on layers established on
mobile devices, which intrinsically distributes cost to all participating users.
In this section we presented two systems (Paper III [3], Paper IV [77]) that
employ opportunistic communication and leverage existing Wi-Fi hardware




In this chapter we revisit the research questions presented in Section 1.2.
We also present public attention our work has been exposed to. Finally, we
conclude this thesis with some final remarks.
4.1 Research Questions Revisited
RQ1: What kind of device and/or user related information is deducible
from eavesdropped Wi-Fi background traffic?
Device fingerprinting is used to profile devices in a crowd. In Paper I
we present a multichannel monitoring system which is able to inspect
the channel sweeping pattern different devices use when querying for
networks. This information can be used as yet another parameter to
individualize devices. Fingerprinting can be used to trace disposable
MAC addresses back to the original device. After collecting plenty of
background traffic and applying mechanisms presented in Paper II to
the data, user profiles can be deduced. Section 4.2 presents a practical
scenario demonstrating a user profile pulled from background traffic.
RQ2: How effective are MAC address randomization techniques intro-
duced by various manufacturers in preserving user privacy?
Earlier research has shown that MAC address randomization tech-
niques are not sufficient because of various reasons. The first one
relates to the poor implementation of the randomizing technique it-
self. Secondly, even if devices use pseudonyms instead of their physical
MAC address, fingerprinting provides a way for a monitoring party to
connect seemingly random devices to the same entity. Paper II pro-
vides a metric to quantify how unique a particular device is in a crowd.
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After analyzing the uniqueness distribution of users in six different
data set both before and after applying MAC address randomization
reversing techniques, we argue that the effects of address random-
ization are not significant. Even if MAC address randomization was
implemented properly, mistakes like exposing a PNL deteriorates user
anonymity.
RQ3: How can we prevent private information from leaking through the
network discovery protocol defined by the Wi-Fi standard?
A prominent cause for private information leaking are the directed
probes employed by active network discovery. An alternative discov-
ery mechanism, passive network discovery, does not expose names of
previously associated networks. In Paper II we evaluate performance
implications between active and passive network discovery.
RQ4: Can we leverage the transmission range of Wi-Fi clients and use
it as a location-centric addressing mechanism?
In Papers III and IV we present two different opportunistic com-
munication systems that leverage the transmission range of Wi-Fi.
WiPush [3] uses transmission range as an intrinsic addressing mech-
anism to deliver spatio-temporal push messages. Use-cases of the
Prongle system [77] imply communication with nearby nodes within
a typical range of Wi-Fi hardware. Our evaluation shows that we are
able to get a 95% transmission success rate at a 50-meter distance.
RQ5: Can we utilize the existing Wi-Fi infrastructure of restricted ac-
cess points and make it useful for a broader scope of clients?
In Paper III we introduce an opportunistic push notification system
the leverages the high density of access points in metropolitan areas.
The system can ideally be deployed on consumer-grade hardware,
which could reduce deployment costs. The system we propose exploits
active network discovery and operates coordinated with it in order to
minimize energy expenditure.
RQ6: How could experimental Wi-Fi communication systems be piloted
with minimal deployment effort and overhead?
Novel networking systems often require low-level modifications on
participating devices. In Paper IV we propose the Prongle system,
which introduces a companion device that provides a more flexible
and controllable platform to develop novel communication systems
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on top of. Interaction with the Prongle system happens through a
smartphone app, which involves no changes to opt-in users’ devices.
4.2 Publicity and Impact
As stated earlier in Chapter 2, privacy may not be of great importance to
an average user — until it gets violated. As long as something as ordinary
as Wi-Fi delivers the promised connectivity, users tend to easily think that
everything is in order regarding the protocol. Breaking this illusion can
be ultimately hard, especially since vendors seem to have overlooked the
privacy issues discussed in this thesis. An effective wake-up call to anyone
is to witness a violation personally. In the spring of 2016 a perfect oppor-
tunity occurred for us to demonstrate early work presented in this thesis at
the 9th Science Slam1 held in Helsinki. It is a science popularizing event
which welcomes researchers from all fields to present interesting things in
an entertaining style. The presentation we held was called “Turn Off Your
WiFi!” and it was given by Professor Jussi Kangasharju.
During the presentation a setup of the Wireless Shark (Paper I, [75])
was collecting PNLs from the audience. The presentation explained in pop-
ular terms how network discoveries reveal information about other networks
stored on the device. The presentation also demonstrated SSID pinpoint-
ing, which can be done with the help of external crowd-sourced services like
WiGLE2. The presentation demonstrated an example seen in Figure 4.1.
Red circles in the figure show the information WiGLE has from an SSID
called “honeypot” in downtown Helsinki, and the red X indicates the loca-
tion we know this access point used to be.
Additionally, the presentation demonstrated a brief analysis of a previ-
ously witnessed user whose PNL had been exposed. From this users PNL
we publicly deduced the following:
  Device manufacturer (Apple, based on OUI)
  Three non-public networks at company Z (Workplace?)
  Restaurant nearby the campus (Lunchplace?)
  Three airports (A, B, and C, where B is a hub between A and C)
  Airline in-flight Wi-Fi (Airline flies from A to C)
  Conference Wi-Fi (Conference site less than 50km from C)
  Neighboring state university Wi-Fi




Figure 4.1: Circles show the information WiGLE has from a SSID called
“honeypot”. The red X indicates the actual location of this access point.
Even if we do not have a name for the person in question, this list tells
a story about someone. Neither can we tell the time when the user was
visiting these networks. However, this information combined with some
other information sources (conference proceedings, company Z and univer-
sity staff, etc.) could get us on track regarding a real identity. Gladly
this person’s device did not reveal a unique home SSID, since that typi-
cally narrows the search down significantly. Our presentation ended with
displaying all the PNL entries that had been collected during the evening
from the crowd. Nothing was deduced from that data, and it was only to
demonstrate how such information can be collected without consent. The
winner at Science Slam events is voted by the audience. Our presentation
apparently made a point because it won first place.
The impact of such public awareness events remains to be seen. Making
an actual change is eventually up to the developers of networking compo-
nents and drivers — and not to forget vendor initiative. I sincerely hope
that related publications get as much visibility as possible at networking
conferences and task forces, since those are the most prominent venues for
constructive discussion to emerge regarding the current situation.
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4.3 Conclusion
In this thesis we built a multichannel monitoring system and used it to col-
lect and investigate background traffic that is generated by Wi-Fi capable
smart devices. We found out yet another way to fingerprint devices and
make anonymization attempts through MAC address randomization even
less effective. We introduced a metric to quantify the uniqueness of a wire-
less device, and showed that the effects of MAC address randomization are
not that significant. We exposed the problem with active network discov-
ery and that exposing the so-called preferred networks list (PNL) through
directed probe requests can tell a whole lot about the user possessing the
device. The habit of resorting to any incidental “Free Wi-Fi” escalates the
problem. On the other hand, the rapid increase in cellular data and price
plans encourages users to offload traffic through alternative networks.
Opportunistic networks have been proposed in various flavors to serve
as alternative ways to move data and complement the struggling cellular
networks. Such networks typically operate on layers established on mobile
devices, which intrinsically distributes cost to all participating users. In this
thesis we presented two opportunistic networking systems that operate over
conventional Wi-Fi hardware. WiPush is an opportunistic push notifica-
tion system which leverages the existing Wi-Fi infrastructure. The system
provides spatio-temporal push notifications over Wi-Fi without association.
Finally, we presented a system for opportunistic, lightweight communica-
tion over unassociated Wi-Fi for various use cases, such as smart traffic and
delay-tolerant networks.
The contributions of this thesis were two-fold. For the latter part, only
time will tell what kind of communication paradigms will cope in our ever-
evolving connected environment. As for the privacy-related contributions,
the most important take-away is:
Turn off your Wi-Fi — unless you’re actually using it.
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